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In quasi-markets, contracts ﬁnd purchasers inﬂuencing health care providers, although problems exist
where providers use personal bias and heuristics to respond to written agreements, tending towards the
moral hazard of opportunism. Previous research on quasi-market contracts typically understands
opportunism as fully rational, individual responses selecting maximally efﬁcient outcomes from a set of
possibilities. We take a more emotive and collective view of contracting, exploring the inﬂuence of
institutional logics in relation to the opportunistic behaviour of dentists. Following earlier qualitative
work where we identiﬁed four institutional logics in English general dental practice, and six dental
contract areas where there was scope for opportunism; in 2013 we surveyed 924 dentists to investigate
these logics and whether they had predictive purchase over dentists' chair-side behaviour. Factor analysis
involving 300 responses identiﬁed four logics entwined in (often technical) behaviour: entrepreneurial
commercialism, duty to staff and patients, managerialism, public good.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Contracts are the fulcrum of quasi-markets in health care (Allen,
2002): a separation of purchasers and providers can only work if
there is agreement over what health care should be provided and at
what price. Complete presentiment in contracts, however, is an
abstraction of classical economics, not a product of contingent
experience. Exchange is neither costless, nor the market ‘free’e the
prior costs of negotiating and the subsequent costs associated with
regulation and monitoring complicate any exchange. Thus con-
tracts are ‘neither faceless, nor instantaneous’ (Williamson, 1985,
pp. 56). Sources of uncertainty and hence the costs of transacting
are three fold. First, we cannot know all possibly relevant factors in
the process of exchange, and as one contracts these factors and
their possible relevance change e human behaviours are uncertain.
Second, the less frequent, short and consistent a transaction the
more complex the contract and the less secure its terms. Third, the
less transferable and ﬂexible the assets being invested in, the morevices Research, Institute Psy-
aterhouse Building, Block B,
, L69 3GL, UK.
).
Ltd. This is an open access article uvulnerable the investment is to wider environmental changes (new
markets, technology, geo-politics) that change the value of the as-
sets during the contracting process.
Of these sources ‘behavioural uncertainty is of particular
importance to an understanding of transaction cost economics is-
sues’ (Williamson, 1985, pp. 57). Whilst contracts might be
designed to cope with the complexity of possible decision trees,
and be ﬂexible enough to allow for changes in investment, they
struggle with uncertainties in behaviour that, for Williamson, are a
function of adverse selection andmoral hazard. Adverse selection is
a function of bounded reason ewe have no hawk's eye view, rather
we occupy perspectives inﬂuenced by habit, adopting what Simon
(1979) calls administrative behaviour. People strive for rational
outcomes from previously established settings of group loyalty
(friends, colleagues) and authority (hierarchies, law) and are forced
into creating (pragmatic) procedures that work. Rather than being
maximally rational, decisions are permeatedwith personal bias and
historical preference, for without closed systems (falling upon
habits and heuristics with limited variables and consequences)
decisions would never get taken e thus adverse selection is inev-
itable. What is more, moral hazard emerges from human tendency
to behave opportunistically e following stipulations as contrib-
uting to perceived interests. Thus contracts become prey to partiesnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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manner to avoid, dilute, or re-orient contractual obligations
(Williamson, 1985, pp. 45e47), putting onus on contract design to
mitigate adverse selection and manage opportunism.
Health systems e notably the UK's National Health Service
(NHS) e have witnessed a burgeoning use of contracts. Concomi-
tantly, attending to moral hazard is becoming increasingly impor-
tant in an environment where activities involve millions of people,
where assets are expensive and highly speciﬁc, and where de-
mographic changes and budget constraints put increasing strain on
provision. Primarily it is the purchasers and government regulators
e as commissioners of health services e who are advised to
“scrutinize contracts for possible ways in which opportunism may
affect all parties” (Roberts, 1993), so channelling the self-interest of
contracting parties toward provision of what remains a public good
(Ferlie, 1992). The emphasis is on identifying and closing loopholes,
and a close monitoring of behaviours, to prevent opportunism from
blossoming. Where opportunistic behaviour and transaction costs
are extensive, the contract between purchaser and provider is
widely seen as having failed.
The contract between purchasers and providers of a speciﬁc
form of health care e NHS general dental practice, has been
repeatedly revised to try to address unintended consequences
arising from moral hazard (Harris et al., 2014); most notably seen
where a trial of dentists' remuneration based on capitation pay-
ments (1984e1987) was associated with an increase in the pro-
portion of untreated decayed teeth, raising concerns about
‘supervised neglect’ (Coventry et al., 1989). Payments for ﬁllings
and crowns were subsequently re-introduced. A further experi-
ment with restructuring remuneration in Personal Dental Service
(PDS) pilots (1998e2006) also found that clinical procedures
declined when not speciﬁcally remunerated (Department of
Health, 2009). These PDS type contracts were then replaced by a
new dental contract in 2006, based on Units of Dental Activity
(UDAs). But this UDA system has also failed, on account of a fall in
complex treatments and an increase in the number of extractions
(House of Commons, 2008). Work re-designing the dental contract
is again underway with a new model expected in the next few
years.
Most previous studies relating dentists' behavioural responses
to incentives have tended to report on natural experiments asso-
ciated with contract change and debate the relative efﬁciency of
different remuneration systems (Chalkley et al., 2010; Tickle et al.,
2011). Throughout the tactical behaviour of the dental practi-
tioner remains unexplored since the research stance still tends
toward a neoclassical assumption of hyper-rationality where the
dental practitioner is seen as making optimal choices from a
sharply deﬁned set of possibilities. A weakness in current research
is a narrow focus on dental practices as a production function with
technological outputs, without considering behaviours and their
inﬂuence on contract design and use.
To study behaviour, as is hinted at but little pursued in Wil-
liamson's posing moral hazard as a critical determinant of any
contractual form, entails a dynamic view of quasi-market con-
tracting where agents (human beings, organisations) are viewed as
not emerging fully formed, but undergoing processes of creation
and evolution (Ferlie, 1992), with local ‘rules of the game’, learning,
and bargaining styles building incrementally over years of opera-
tion. Contracting becomes an iterative, learning process, with a
series of inevitable unintended consequences, negotiations and
amendments, and a means by which social institutions arise and
are shaped, rather than planned (Hughes et al., 1997). This brings
into question the prevailing rational assumption that institutions
(routines, values, social objects like money) are instrumental de-
vices enlisted through the decisions of sovereign agents. Far frombeing tools of rational ordering, such institutions carry structure
and meaning in their own right. Institutions are instead deﬁned by
prevailing habits (e.g. recur to previously successful formulae for
acting); scripts (procedures); and heuristics (moral guidance), all of
which inform what does and/or should happen in evolving cir-
cumstances (Checkland et al., 2012). These understandings have
been termed institutional logics: belief systems carried by agents as
organising principles that create connections and a common pur-
pose, allowing those within an organisational ﬁeld a sense of
grounding and habituated normalcy (Friedland and Alford, 1991);
an organisational ﬁeld here representing the environment inwhich
institutional forces are structured, say in the form of speciﬁc or-
ganisations, laws, or symbolic patterns (Scott et al., 2000). They
‘provide the formal and informal rules of action, interaction and
interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers in
accomplishing the organisation's tasks and in obtaining social
status, credits, penalties and rewards in the process’ (Ocasio, 1997).
Using the framing of institutional logics, our study examines the
nature of contracting behaviour e with speciﬁc reference to the
problem of opportunism e with regard for the evolving behaviour
of dentists and dental practices. We conceive dentists (who
combine the ownership of small businesses with the provision of
care deﬁned by professional codes), as acting from within the
dental practice, itself structured as an organisation set in a wider
organisational ﬁeld of dental health care provision, across which
are woven multiple, evolving and sometimes conﬂicting institu-
tional logics. For example, dentists experience pressure to produce
commercially sound returns, at the same time as conforming to
professional norms associated with sustained and beneﬁcial care,
and in addition experience forces from other ﬁelds, say the legal
ﬁeld through employment laws, and the inﬂuence of community
values in the ﬁeld of local politics, all of which might unsettle and
skew activity in ways often contractually unacknowledged. All the
while these agents work within and contribute to institutionalised
processes, they learn and adapt to activities governed by shared
meaning and signiﬁcance. In turn, they inﬂuence these processes of
provision and value, both through habituation and the bringing of
habit into re-alignment in the wake of unsettling or innovatory
experience e professionalisation and institutionalisation are sym-
biotic (Scott et al., 2000; Muzio et al., 2013). New technologies,
changing political priorities, changing demographics and expecta-
tions, the rise of alternative providers and myriad other inﬂuences
make for a dynamic, evolving environment inwhich care practice is
only ever on the move.
In an earlier paper, we identiﬁed four institutional logics being
(re)woven into general dental practice: ownership responsibility,
professionalism, population health managerialism and entrepre-
neurial commercialism; that whilst not mutually exclusive, and
sometimes in competition, appeared distinct enough as sets of
beliefs aroundwhich organisation occurred (Harris and Holt, 2013).
In this paper we report ﬁndings from a subsequent quantitative
study of dental practitioners. We conﬁrm the presence of logics
associated with entrepreneurial commercialism (dentists exploit-
ing technical and business opportunities for commercial gain) and
managerialism (dentists accounting for activity using administra-
tive measurement systems). We further reﬁne and reconﬁgure the
logics of ownership responsibility and professionalism (the study
found dentists committed to the sustainability of the dental prac-
tice understood as an enterprise, framed around a responsibility
and obligation to staff employed by principal dentist/s and to pa-
tients). In doing so we add to the literature on public sector moti-
vation and professionalism, where previously these two concepts
have been identiﬁed as distinct, but also ‘related in ways that have
not yet been fully analysed’ (Andersen, 2009). We further show
how logics form and reform, rather than being static. In the frame of
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of payment rules for care governed by the NHS dental contract.
Our paper is structured as follows. We describe the study
context, explaining the ‘grey areas’ of the dental contract that leave
scope for opportunism. We then present our study, outlining the
measures used and analysis strategy, then describe the factor
analysis of institutional logics followed by an analysis of how these
guide interpretations of the contract in dentists' everyday work,
notably the experience of moral hazard. Since mutual co-operation
between principal and agent are recognised as the ‘antithesis of
opportunism’ (Howden-Chapman, 1993), the analysis includes
variables concerning providers' relationships with purchasers, so
further explaining how providers vary in their response to rules
and norms inﬂuencing dental care provision.
2. Institutional background
NHS dental practice is mainly based on a professional partner-
ship model with practitioners acting as independent contractors.
Dental practice premises and facilities are owned by principal
dentist/s who are also responsible for payment of staff and over-
heads. Practices are permitted to earn income from both NHS and
private work and so practices often provide a mixture of NHS and
private services to a greater or lesser degree.
The current NHS dental contract details a currency of UDAs,
which are courses of treatments weighted by complexity. Each
procedure is classiﬁed into a band determining the number of UDAs
earned. Thus a dentist is remunerated the same amount for doing,
say, four ﬁllings on a patient, as he/she would be for doing just one
ebecause treatment bands take account of the type of treatment,
not the number of procedures undertaken. There are thus disin-
centives to preferentially select patients for care who need rela-
tively low numbers of, say, ﬁllings or extractions, and to avoid
taking patients onwho need expensive types of care such as crowns
and bridges (the practice has to bear the cost for laboratory
work) (Department of Health, 2009). A contract between the
practice and Primary Care Trust (PCT) commissioners stipulates an
annual number of UDAs to be achieved for an agreed value. Since
over-achievement of the UDA target at the end of the ﬁnancial year
is not rewarded, and under-achievement comes with a ﬁnancial
penalty, there are incentives for dentists and practices to skew
workload toward realising contract targets, no more, no less. A
system of patient co-payment also exists, alongside reimbursement
from commissioners according to activity; with each band of ac-
tivity having an associated level of patient charge, which dental
practices collect directly from the patient. Thus dentists encounter
care under a rubric of patient charges, undertaking or classifying
certain care according to a particular band of activity, and so
appreciate where gains and losses are made.
To analyse this contractual encounter we began with a factor
analysis to test the existence and persistence of the previously
qualitatively identiﬁed logics and how these were associated with
dentists' tactical use of the contract, especially the room for
opportunism in contractual ‘grey areas’. Our ﬁrst hypothesis stated
that items pertaining to logics would form identiﬁable factors
analogous to the four logics uncovered in our earlier qualitative
study (Harris and Holt, 2013). In our second hypothesis we exam-
ined the roles of logics in predicting decision-making in relation to
six contract ‘grey areas’. Since we were unclear as to the directions
in which speciﬁc logics might inﬂuence decision-making, we made
two-tailed predictions that logics would be associated with self-
reports of intentions to engage in practices within the next two
years. We also viewed any inﬂuence of logics on behaviour in
relational terms: and so in our third hypothesis we assumed the
effects of logics on opportunism were more pronounced wheredentists had negative views of their dealings with commissioners.
Thus, we investigated whether dentists' negative perceptions of
their relationships with commissioners interacted with higher
scores on logics to predict intentions to engage in opportunism.
3. Methods
Using interview data from earlier qualitative work (Harris and
Holt, 2013) we generated 47 institutional logics items, each
phrased as a stem statement relating to various aspects of practi-
tioners' goals, norms and values (e.g. ‘having a practice business
plan is important to me’, was derived from qualitative data relating
to entrepreneurial commercialism logic). Participants were asked
to rate the importance of each item on a 5-point scale anchored by
the terms ‘not at all important’ (coded 1) and ‘essential’ (5) (See
Supplementary data online). The qualitative work also allowed us
to identify six areas where dentists' interpretation of the contract,
when informed by their own self-interest (or when acting as an
agent on behalf of patients), led to behaviour which could differ
from the self-interested view of commissioners. We generated six
items relating to the following six scenarios as possible types of
opportunism (See Supplementary data online):
1) whether practitioners were willing to accept an NHS patient
because the extent of necessary work meant remuneration was
insufﬁcient to cover the costs, meaning low or no proﬁt
(avoiding high cost patients);
2) restriction of certain types of NHS treatment (e.g. root canal
treament) where remuneration was insufﬁcient to cover prac-
tice costs (restricting high cost treatment);
3) undertaking more complex treatments towards the ﬁnancial
year end to meet targets (over-representing patients' diagnosis);
4) restricting access to NHS routine care towards ﬁnancial year end
where targets had already been met (inequitable care);
5) allocating payment claims for treatment to a lower Band than
appropriate, meaning patient contributes a lower charge (under-
representing need for patients' co-payment);
6) ﬂouting national guidelines on period of recall recommending
the period between check-ups for low-risk patients be between
12 months and 2 years; (over-allocation of treatment resources).
Participants answered questions relating to: a) past behaviour
(how often they had engaged in that behaviour e.g. over the pre-
vious two years'); b) intended behaviour within the next two years
assuming a hypothetical stability of contracts; c) descriptive norms
(perceived frequency of the behaviour by other English dentists/
practices). Response sets for intended and previous behaviours and
descriptive norms used a ﬁve category response set labelled ‘Never’
(0), ‘Rarely’ (1), ‘Occasionally’ (2), ‘Often’ (3) or ‘Routinely’ (4).
Practitioners' perceptions of injunctive norms were measured by
asking for views on what proportion of English dentists ‘might not
approve’ of behaviour. This response set consisted of ﬁve categories
labelled as ‘None’ (0), ‘Less than 10%’ (2), about ‘10e50%’ (3),
‘50e75%’ (4) and ‘almost all’ (5).
Relationships with commissioners were assessed using a 18-
item scale also derived from our earlier qualitative work and
based on the principles of honesty, openness and interactional and
distributive justice (See Supplementary data online). Participants
rated their experiences of dealings with commissioners as positive
(e.g., ‘I have always found the PCT to be dependable’) or negative
(e.g., The PCT have rarely listened to my views') on a 5-point scale
anchored by the terms ‘strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5)’.
Positive items were reversed and an average item score used. We
found all 18 items so highly correlated that we used the items as a
single scale (which we named negative experiences): a principal
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8.60 with a minimum loading of .47. The Cronbach alpha of this
scale was .93 indicating high internal consistency.
National research ethics approval (Reference number 10/H1011/
38) and NHS research governance approvals were obtained for the
study. All questionnaire items were piloted with nine practitioners
instructed to provide interpretations on item content and response
formats and to challenge items containing confusing or unclear
meanings. Between January and April 2013 a postal questionnaire
was sent to a cluster sample of 924 dentists named as practice
owners on a national register of dental practices. The list included
dentist-owners ranging from fully-NHS to fully-private practices.
Sample size was calculated to enable the prediction of opportu-
nistic behaviour from institutional logics. No precedent exists to
show likely effect sizes, but our analysis strategy (see below) was
conservative, potentially yielding small effect sizes. Cohen (1988)
deﬁnes a small effect size in regression analysis as a DR2 of .02,
requiring a sample of 387 with alpha of .80 and probability of
p< 0.05. To achieve this, we used a cluster sample of dentists ac-
cording to PCT areas for convenience. PCTs have on average 60e70
dentists per area, and so assuming a 40% response rate, 14 PCTs
were sampled. Six PCT areas in northern England were selected
covering both urban/rural and mixed socio-economic proﬁle areas,
and were the areas where the initial case study work had been
undertaken. A further eight PCT areas were then chosen randomly
from the 152 PCTs nationally. After three mailings, 393 question-
naires were returned (43%); 333 of these from NHS dentists. Of
these, 33 questionnaires were discarded because of four or more
missing data points on the 47 logics items (those with three or less
missing data points were replaced through a process of multiple
imputation in SPSS v20).3.1. Analysis strategy
We made no assumption that the four logics described in our
earlier qualitative work would be the same as those identiﬁed in
our quantitativework, and therefore entered all 47 logics items into
an exploratory factor analysis. Scree plots were used to identify the
optimal number of factors and factor extraction in further analyses
limited to these. To allow factors to be correlated, an oblique
rotation was used. Items that did not load onto one or more factors
were discarded (Floyd and Widaman (1995), using Tabachnick and
Fidell's (2007) criteria of loadings of between .32 and .32 on the
pattern matrix). Factor scores were retained and used for the
analysis. Follow-up conﬁrmatory factor analysis could not be used
because the sample size was inadequate for division into explor-
atory and conﬁrmatory sub-samples.
We used intended behaviour in the six ‘grey areas’ of the con-
tract over the coming two years as outcome variables. Examining
intentions whilst controlling current behaviour alleviates the
methodological problem of reverse correlation that arises when
past behaviour is used as an outcome variable. This creates a
stringent test of the hypotheses because signiﬁcance tests apply to
the extent to which variables predict the criterion independently of
each other, since the majority of variance in future intentions is
explained by past behaviour leaving limited scope for other pre-
dictors (Traﬁmow, 2004). We also provided a stringent test of hy-
potheses by statistically controlling broader social norms e
descriptive norms and injunctive norms. Hypotheses were tested
using two sets of regression analyses. The ﬁrst set examined unique
prediction of behavioural intentions by norms and institutional
logics. Signiﬁcance testing of regression beta weightings was used
to assess unique relationships between individual predictor and the
outcome variables in each regression analysis.The second set of analyses involved moderated regressions
examining negative experiences with commissioners and the logics
generated from our factor analysis. This analysis was restricted to
data from a sub-sample of dentists who had experience of nego-
tiating with commissioners (n¼ 288); in dental practices with
partnership arrangements sometimes only some of the partners
take on the role of dealing with commissioners. This second set of
analyses followed the same format as the other, but added negative
commissioning experiences and the logics factors. Interaction
terms were computed from the product of centred relationship
scores and each of the saved logics factor scores, and entered into
regression equations with main effect variables to predict oppor-
tunistic behavioural intentions. Demographic, practice type and
practice ﬁnance variables were entered into all analyses to serve as
control variables. Practice ﬁnance variables included likert-type
responses to questions asking if the practice ﬁnancial turnover
had changed in the last two years (reduced signiﬁcantly to
increased signiﬁcantly), the extent of difﬁculty in sustaining busi-
ness proﬁts over the previous ﬁve years. Signiﬁcance testing of
regression beta weightings was used to assess unique relationships
between predictor and outcome variables in each regression
analysis.
4. Results
4.1. Description of the sample
Of the respondents used in the ﬁrst analysis, 225 (79%) were
male and 69 (21%) female. This reﬂects national ﬁgures, showing
23% of dentists owning practices are female (Health and Social Care
Information Centre, 2012). Dentists had a mean age of 49.31
(SD¼ 8.80) and a mean time in practice of 26.78 years (SD¼ 9.18).
The median number of dentists working in each practice was 3
(inter-quartile range (IQ) 2e5). The median percentage of NHS/
private mix of work in the practice (based on patient numbers) was
75% (IQ range 29e95) and private work 30% (IQ range 5e75). Again,
this was roughly comparable to national ﬁgures which show that
57% of dentists spend 75% or more of their time on NHS dentistry
(Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2012).
4.2. Descriptive analyses
Table 1 shows the distributions of responses relating to dentists'
past behaviour and future (over the next two years) intentions to
behave opportunistically, and descriptive and injunctive norms.
Higher levels of past and intended behaviour were observed where
the behaviour related to dentists working as an agent on behalf of
patients (behaviours 5 and 6). These two items also showed greater
correspondences between prior and intended behaviour. Intentions
to engage in the ﬁrst four behaviours were considerably higher
than previous behaviour, but not the ﬁnal two. This may be an
artefact of the methodology, but one interpretation for this is that
dentists were intending to change their behaviour to engage in
more behaviour against the interests of commissioners than in the
past (possibly as a consequence of completing the questionnaire).
4.3. Hypothesis 1 e factor analysis institutional logics
Table 2 shows the ﬁnal analysis with Eigen values and the per-
centage of variance accounted for by each factor, loadings of indi-
vidual items of greater than .30 on the pattern matrix and inter-
factoral correlations. Factor 1 closely resembles ‘entrepreneurial
commercialism’; characterised by higher loadings on an impor-
tance of seeking commercial opportunity (Table 2). Factor 2 was
characterised by higher loadings of items concerning a ‘duty to staff
Table 1
Percentages of dentists reporting frequencies of opportunistic behaviour in the past, intentions of future opportunism, estimates of the frequencies of other dentists'
opportunism and percentage of other dentists who would approve of opportunism.
Avoiding high cost
patients
Restricting high cost
treatment
Over-representing
patients' diagnosis
Inequitable care Under-representing
patients' co-payment
Over-allocation of
treatment resources
because of patients'
demands
Past Intent Other
dentists
Past Intent Other
dentists
Past Intent Other
dentists
Past Intent Other
dentists
Past Intent Other
dentists
Past Intent Other
dentists
Never 65.8 45.3 3.4 53.4 41.3 1.3 43.5 35.8 2.2 74.0 63.1 3.2 34.4 34.1 8.2 8.1 8.7 .3
Rarely 16.3 20.1 5.3 21.4 23.4 2.8 23.3 26.1 11.1 11.5 19.4 14.9 13.8 17.4 33.9 23.9 22.7 16.5
Once 11.8 16.8 27.6 14.7 19.7 27.3 22.7 25.2 40.0 8.7 10.7 48.1 23.8 24.4 40.8 32.0 34.3 38.9
Often 3.8 10.4 43.6 7.3 11.0 46.7 8.6 10.6 34.0 4.5 4.9 27.5 17.4 15.1 12.3 27.5 26.2 36.4
Routinely 2.2 7.4 19.7 3.2 4.8 21.6 1.6 3.3 11.7 1.0 1.6 5.7 9.6 8.0 4.1 8.1 7.8 7.6
Approve none 1.3 .9 2.2 4.1 8.3 .6
Less than 10% 12.9 9.4 23.0 28.0 37.1 18.7
10e50% 36.0 30.7 37.1 36.0 34.5 40.6
50e75% 24.6 30.4 24.0 18.8 11.2 28.9
Almost all 24.9 28.2 12.8 12.4 8.0 10.5
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cerned reciprocal relationships with staff within the practice,
although also correlated were items related to a responsibility to
patients, and the importance of professional reputation. All theTable 2
Factor analysis on institutional logics.
Factor 1
Entrepreneurial com
Eigenvalue 8.30
Percent variance 21.84
Pattern matrix Loading
2 Supporting staff through personal difﬁculties
3 Having a practice business plan .435
4 Having harmonious relations in the practice
5 My responsibility for the care provided
6 Happy atmosphere amongst staff
7 Opportunities to sell to the patient .548
8 Reputation of the practice in the local community
9 Maintaining business to secure staff employment
11 Staff should share same work related values
12 Identifying new business opportunities .764
13 Practice endures for longstanding patients
14 Retaining staff in the practice
15 Receiving support from staff
16 Equal care standards whether NHS or Private
18 Discuss treatment options with patients
19 Dentists professionally responsible for patients
20 Financial implications of advising patients .316
23 Patient satisfaction with care provided
24 Accountable to commissioners for care
25 Review of practice policies and procedures
27 Care as part of a publicly funded system
28 Expanding the practice as a business .859
29 Building goodwill to enhance value of practice .548
30 Paper trail of practice procedures
31 Payment schedule statistics for performance information
32 Supporting staff through professional difﬁculties
33 Using public money in cost-efﬁcient way
34 Feeling part of the NHS
35 Expanding the practice as a business .863
36 The branding of the practice .741
39 Business aspects of the practice .667
40 Positioning the practice in the market place .772
42 Reducing population inequalities in oral health
43 Adapting the business in a changing environment .563
44 Remuneration in line with years of training/skills .341
45 Identifying new business opportunities .867
46 Regular review of practice policies and procedures
47 Being highly regarded by other local dentists
Factor intercorrelations
Factor 1 Entrepreneurial commercialism
Factor 2 Duty to staff and patients
Factor 3 Managerialismitems which fell within Factor 2 were derived from what we had
previously pictured separately as ‘ownership responsibility’ logic
and ‘professionalism’ logics (Harris and Holt, 2013). Factor 2
therefore prompted us to query our previous conceptualisation ofmercialism
Factor 2
Duty to staff and patients
Factor 3
Managerialism
Factor 4
Public goods
4.39 2.44 1.50
11.56 6.41 3.96
.587
.630
.489
.655
.374
.517
.578
.648
.725
.643
.359 .348
.408
.421
.456
.379 .384
.726
.656
.655
.403
.640
.585
.592
.567
.785
.404
.19 .19 .10
.29 .18
.15
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by the profession accompanied by altruistic motivations to work in
the best interests of the patient e as portrayed in the wider liter-
ature concerned with professionalism (Hanlon, 1998). Moreover,
the traditionally held view of professionalism as involving a
concernwith ‘being a dentist’ and having a duty to peers within the
dental profession also did not emerge as signiﬁcant from our
analysis. Instead, professionalism was expressed in relational
terms, with caring as an extended process emanating from high
quality relationships within the dental practice to encompass pa-
tients and the community. This conforms with Muzio et al.'s (2013)
sense of the entwined evolution of professional logics and
contractual institutionalisation, with professional logic here
encompassing what we previously conceptualised as ‘ownership
responsibility’, where dentists cultivate practice culture around
service values. This does not mean dentists regard more traditional
aspects of professional practice as unimportant, merely that these
elements were not integrated into a unitary schema of professional
practice in our data.
Factor 3 and 4 both contained elements of what we previously
described as ‘population health managerialism’ logic, but allowed
further development of the concept. Factor analysis distinguished
‘managerialism’ (Factor 3) as characterised by an acceptance of
external accountability and power connected to state regulation
and management principles from the private sector. Factor 4 on the
other hand was characterised by high loadings on the importance
of publicly-funded healthcare, reducing health inequalities and
accountability for public money. We consequently labelled this
factor ‘public goods’ e goods/services from whose beneﬁts no-one
is excluded and whose consumption by one does not diminish
consumption by another (WHO, 2013). The term denotes one per-
son's contribution conferring a beneﬁt on a group of people, but,
given the possibility of private not-for-proﬁt provision, there is no
presumption of public sector monopoly (Sugden, 1984).4.4. Correlations between predictor variables and behaviour in
relation to contract rules
Pearson and point-biserial correlations in Table 3 show female
dentists less likely to engage in ‘grey area’ behaviours. Practices
having a higher proportion of NHS patients were also found to have
fewer intentions to refuse patients who might represent a ﬁnancial
loss to the practice; and more intentions to under-representTable 3
Correlations between predictor variables and behavioural intentions relating to six areas
Avoiding high
cost patients
Restricting high
cost treatment
Over-re
patient
Gender .23** .17** .02
Years in Practice .06 .05 .09
No. dentists per practice .10 .07 .00
Percent NHS patient mix .16** .04 .04
Past behaviour .59 .75 .84
UDA Price .05 .07 .05
Proﬁt trend .18** .07 .00
Turnover trend .01 .00 .03
Descriptive norms .36** .32** .42
Injunctive norms .42** .41** .41
Entrepreneurial commercialism
logic
.08 .23** .06
Duty to staff and patients logic .11* 11* .12
Managerialism logic .04 .14* .07
Public goods logic .17** .12** 04
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.001.patients' co-payments, for the sake of the patient. Both descriptive
and injunctive norms were positively related to all six behaviours.
The ﬁrst four behaviours were generally predicted by the practi-
tioner placing a higher importance on entrepreneurial commer-
cialism (Factor 1); and lower importance on duty to staff and
patients (Factor 2) and public goods values (Factor 4). Under-
representing patients' co-payment was related to having a lower
sense of commercialism logic and a higher score for public goods
logic. Overriding NICE guidelines related to recall periods was
associated with low managerialism logic scores (Factor 3).4.5. Hypothesis 2 e regression analyses predicting intentions to
behave opportunistically
Regression analyses are presented in Table 4. Past behaviour was
used as the only covariate because it subsumed variance explained
by demographic and practice variables. In the full sample, higher
descriptive or injunctive norms scores were associated with the
ﬁrst three behaviour intentions. Higher entrepreneurial commer-
cialism logic scores were associated with behavioural intentions 2,
4 and 5. Duty to staff and patients logic scores were associated with
a lower intention to refuse NHS patients who might represent a
ﬁnancial loss to the practice and override NICE guidelines on the
recall period. Neither managerialism logic, nor public goods logics
uniquely predicted any behavioural intentions to behave opportu-
nistically (Table 4).4.6. Hypothesis 3 e facilitation of the role of logics by relationships
with commissioners
We also hypothesised that, amongst dentists who had experi-
ence in dealing with commissioners over the previous two years,
negative experiences would be both directly associated with
opportunism and that negative experiences with commissioners
would also moderate the effects of logics. Moderated regression
analyses presented in Table 4 show that the interaction terms only
predicted intention behaviour in one of the 6 opportunistic be-
haviours: avoiding high cost patients. Following procedures of
Aiken and West (1991), we modelled the three interaction terms.
These ﬁgures (Figs. 1e3) show in three of the four logics (entre-
preneurial commercialism, duty to staff and patients, mana-
gerialism and public goods logics) orientations were associated
with increased intentions to behave opportunistically (high scoresof opportunism.
presenting
s' diagnosis
Inequitable
care
Under-representing
patients' co-payment
Over-allocation of
treatment resources
because of patients'
demands
.10 .02 .05
.01 .02 .03
.06 .04 .03
.00 .38** .01
.83 .94 .92
.18** .22** .03
.11 .13 .04
.01 .02 .02
** .23** .51** .70**
** .26** .37** .61**
.12* .26** .02
* .09 .09 .02
.03 .02 .27**
.05 .24** .07
Table 4
Regression analyses predicting intentions to engage in chair-side opportunism.
1. Avoiding High
cost patients
2. Restricting High
cost treatment
3. Over-Representing
patients' diagnosis
4. Inequitable
Care
5. Under-Representing
patients' co-payment
6. Over-Allocation
of treatment
resources because
of patients' demands
Full sample
R2 (Adj) .41** .63** .73** .70** .88** .84**
Past behaviour .47** .76** .77** .80** .87** .82**
Descriptive norms .12* .04 .10* .04 .04 .08
Injunctive norms .19** .13** .05 .04 .04 .05
Entrepreneurial commercialism logic .07 .10* .01 .08* .05* .03
Duty to staff and patients logic .11* .06 .01 .04 .03 .06*
Managerialism logic .05 .06 .01 .02 .03 .02
Public goods logic .04 .06 .05 .00 .06 .02
Negotiation sub-sample
R2 (Adj) .42** .61** .71** .67** .86** .85**
Negative commissioning experience
(Neg)
.12* .04 .05 .05 .06 .02
Neg entrepreneurial commercialism
logic
.13* .05 .02 .05 .00 .05
Neg duty to staff and patients logic .06 .01 .04 .03 .01 .02
Negmanagerialism logic .14* .07 .00 .03 .01 .01
Neg public goods logic .14* .02 .04 .03 .03 .03
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.001.
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take on patients representing a ﬁnancial loss to the practice), but
only if these dentists reported having had negative experiences in
their dealings with commissioners.5. Discussion
Our study departs from technical perspectives previously used
to study this area; where providers and their organisations are
viewed as rational actors albeit in a complex environment (Kratz
and Zajac, 1996). We take instead an institutional perspective
viewing organisations (and their actors) woven into wider insti-
tutional environments that sustain, and are sustained by them. In
doing this we add to the literature on institutional change and the
institutional work associated with it, which remains as suggested
by Reay and Hinings (2009) both ‘important and under-explained’.
This theoretical perspective allows us to look beyond the imme-
diate task environment for explanations of behaviour, to the forces
shaping social rules and rituals. But equally, in elaborating insti-
tutional logics in general dental practice, we link actions (by den-
tists) at themicro-level (dental chair-side) to institutional logics, for
the study directs us to acknowledge the role of actors within dental
practices who have the ‘resourcefulness, abilities and energies ofFig. 1. Interaction between dentists' negative experiences with commissioners and
entrepreneurial commercialism predicting avoidance of high cost patients.individuals to develop workable solutions in spite of competing
logics at the ﬁeld level’ (Reay and Hinings, 2009).
Speciﬁcally, our ﬁndings suggest dentists experience and work
in accord with distinct organised institutional logics associated
with decision-making in the ‘grey areas’ of their contracts. The
structure and inter-relationships of these logics are similar to those
established through qualitative work (Harris and Holt, 2013) but
also showed differences. Askance from previous research ﬁnding
the norms of professionalism to be organised schemas based upon
absolute standards of clinical excellence, altruism and re-
sponsibility, our analyses showed, rather, a strong emphasis on the
relational, with obligations felt similarly in relation to both pa-
tients, staff working in the practice, and the community in which
the practice was situated. We tentatively interpret this as a
response to speciﬁc pressures on dentists to ensure the survival of
the practice, since dentists' ownership of assets (premises) means
that the ﬁnancial viability of practices can be fragile (Harris et al.,
2014). The altruistic components of professionalism are thus
functionally redeﬁned in terms of high quality relationships within
and outside the practice that carry survival value. We also found
that the professionalism factor was statistically related to a
commercialism factor, where clinicians view their practice as an
active competitor in an opportunistic marketplace. We speculateFig. 2. Interaction between dentists' negative experiences with commissioners and
managerialism logic.
Fig. 3. Interaction between dentists' negative experiences with commissioners and
public goods logic.
R. Harris et al. / Social Science & Medicine 122 (2014) 81e8988therefore that both logics may be compatible responses to the
problems of practice survival.
This tension between professional obligation and ﬁnancial
business concerns has been recognised as a feature of dental
practice, not just within the UK system, but also in America
(Dharamsi et al., 2007). The juxtaposing narratives of economics
within dentistry and the theme of professionalism are familiar.
When resources are tight, the casualty appears to be the extent to
which dentists express an ethical obligation to wider society. This
undermines the traditionally held view that one of the funda-
mental components of professionalism is an earning of self-
governance through a willingness to serve society in the public
interest. In the context of dentistry this is seen as carrying a social
responsibility to provide a service for the most vulnerable in the
population (Dharamsi et al., 2007). The main features of profes-
sionalism however shown in our study appear more united around
the immediate needs of the local practice community (patients and
staff), than in concern for the needs of the wider population.
Hanlon (1998), followed by Muzio et al. (2013), recognise profes-
sionalism is a shifting not concrete phenomenon, and we ﬁnd this
to be the case, notably with the expansion of commercialism in
dentistrye the social contract has become one between the dentist,
dental staff, patients and the local community.
That is not to say that dentists do not have public goods con-
cerns e they do (as expressed in Factor 4 which relate to the
importance of a public health system in the cost-effective and fair
distribution of dental services to the community), and which are
distinct from values concerned with external accountability and
management practices (Factor 3). Table 3 shows dentists scoring
highly on the duty to staff and patients also scored highly on public
goods logic; as did dentists scoring highly on entrepreneurial
commercialism. The small correlations however also show a sta-
tistical independence between logics, meaning that any one den-
tist's score on any logic provides a poor prediction of that dentist's
score on the other logics. This independence of logics is in line with
the institutional theory literature which suggests that multiple
logics can co-exist (Muzio et al., 2013).
The pluralistic, organic approach to institutional logics is sup-
ported by our data, and resonates with a conceptualisation of
institutional environments as fragmented and contested, rather
than with earlier portrayals of institutions as isomorphic.
Loundsbury (2008), suggests that multiple logics create diversity of
practice by enabling variety in cognitive orientation and contesta-
tion over which practices are appropriate; whilst acknowledging
that the challenge remains to ‘demonstrate the effect and range of
logics and how they inform practice and activity’. In our study we
demonstrate how amultiplicity of broader cultural beliefs and rulesstructure cognition and guide decision-making of actors in the
ﬁeld. Thus we put the ‘problem’ of adverse selection and moral
hazard within the context of wider institutional change, and
debunk the myth that opportunistic behaviour is a ‘rationalised
impersonal prescriptionwhich is approached in a rule-like way as a
means to pursue technical purposes rationally’ (Loundsbury, 2008).
The study lends weight to scholars who challenge the established
wisdom that institutional and technical forces are like a two stage
model, being separate and distinct, but rather that micro-level
technical considerations are somehow institutionally embedded
(Loundsbury, 2007).
5.1. Limitations
The current study constitutes a successful attempt to test
emerging theory concerning the structure and effects of institu-
tional logics on dentists' opportunistic intentions, but readers will
need to consider three limitations of our methodology. First, most
instruments were developed from directly from our qualitative
work (Harris and Holt, 2013). This has the advantage of improving
their relevance to dentists' expressed concerns, but the disadvan-
tage that there is no evidence of instrument reliability or validity,
save for face validity of the items, that is independent of the current
data set. The second limitation involves the reliance on exploratory,
rather than conﬁrmatory, factor analytic techniques. Consequently,
the structure of the institutional logics has not been subject to
falsiﬁcation. Thirdly, the study is cross-sectional and reliant on
measures of behavioural intention rather than actual chair-side
behaviour. Relationships between behavioural intention and
behaviour are often moderate, and a more appropriate test of
causality would involve prediction of behaviour from institutional
logics measures taken at an earlier time. Thus, a more rigorous test
of the underlying theory would involve both measurement and
structural modelling of hypothesised effects over a ﬁxed time
period.
It is worth noting that we found the proportion of dentists who
reported engaging in opportunism, relatively low. Whilst a degree
of response bias and reporting bias may account for this: fewer
dentists reported engaging in opportunism than their reported
estimates of descriptive norms among the wider population of
dentists and injunctive norms (perceived acceptability of the
behaviour among fellow dentists); nevertheless, we should recog-
nise that, as argued byWilliamson (1993), most agents are engaged
in ‘business-as-usual’, with little or no thought to opportunism,
most of the time. Furthermore, we found those holding a strong
duty of care resisted opportunism in ‘grey areas’ whilst those
holding to commercial logics tended to engage only when experi-
encing negative negotiating relationships with commissioners. The
policy implications therefore are clear, that rather than focussing all
commissioning efforts on contract design issues and patrolling
behaviour around loopholes (with attendant transaction costs);
there are beneﬁts in recognising wider forces shaping behaviour as
dentists respond to contract rules. This has implications which are
wider than just the context of NHS dental contracting. Any situation
e be it contractual arrangements between private US dentists and
those managing insurance schemes, or other contracting situations
outside health care altogether, are beset by the same issue e the
struggle to capture behavioural uncertainty within a contractual
form. Our study provides evidence that a reductionist economist
stance is an insufﬁcient representation of the multi-dimensional
nature of contracting. We argue, with Teubner (2000), that con-
tracting should be seen rather as a discursive project with in-
tertextuality qualities. Contracting is not merely an economic
exchange between parties, nor even an agreement reconstructed as
relational, but a space of ‘compatibility between different
R. Harris et al. / Social Science & Medicine 122 (2014) 81e89 89discursive projects, different contracting worlds’, which study of
institutional logics allows us to explore.
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